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NOTE
RETHINKING PRISONER LITIGATION: SHIFTING
FROM QUALIFIED IMMUNITY TO A GOOD




The vindication of constitutional and federal statutory rights is a
significant source of litigation in federal courts. Section 1983 of Title
421 of the United States Code provides an avenue of redress for citi-
zens whose constitutional or federal statutory rights have been vio-
lated under color of state law.2 Section 1983 has been used to enforce
such rights, especially by plaintiffs who otherwise might not have the
ability to seek effective redress.3 Prisoners constitute one such class of
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2009; B.A., Political
Science, University of Notre Dame, 2006. Thanks to Professor Jennifer Mason
McAward for providing the idea for this Note, and to the members of the Notre Dame
Law Review for their tireless work and helpful suggestions. Finally, thanks to my
family, especially to my fiancee, Nadia, for all your love and support.
1 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). This section provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceed-
ing for redress ....
Id.
2 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess. 216 (1871)), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978).
3 See, e.g., infra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
plaintiffs, 4 as most of their interactions with prison officials involve
action under color of state law.
5
The current state of prisoner § 1983 litigation is marked by
inconsistency. A prisoner whose constitutional or statutory rights have
been violated by prison officials faces significant challenges to even
have her grievances heard in court as new laws require that a prisoner
exhaust all administrative procedures before filing her suit.6 Assum-
ing the prisoner meets the requirements, her suit will progress differ-
ently depending upon whom she sues. If the defendant is a state
prison official, he may be allowed to assert qualified immunity, thus
diminishing the prisoner's chance of successfully achieving redress. 7
If the defendant is a privately employed guard, however, he is not
allowed to assert qualified immunity, but may be able to assert some
form of good faith defense.8 Under this current regime, both prison-
ers and prison guards are treated unjustly.
Adding to the mix is the argument that the federal courts have
been inundated with mostly frivolous prisoner lawsuits. While some
allege the use of excessive force by guards, others allege the denial of
their constitutional right to a certain kind of peanut butter. 9 Given
the characterization of the frivolous nature of the latter and the per-
ception that the majority of prisoner suits fit that mold, 10 prisoner
suits have become a convenient target for those seeking to limit access
4 See Howard B. Eisenberg, Rethinking Prisoner Civil Rights Cases and the Provision
of Counsel, 17 S. ILL. U. LJ. 417, 425 (1993).
5 See infra Part I.B.
6 See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2000).
7 See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561 (1978).
8 See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 413 (1997). Though the Court in
Richardson did not reach this precise question, both the majority and the dissent
assumed that private prison guards are amenable to suit under § 1983.
9 Though the "Peanut Butter Case" is a frequently cited example of frivolous
prisoner lawsuits, the case may not have been as utterly frivolous as it has been made
out to be:
In the "chunky peanut butter" case, the prisoner did not sue because he
received the wrong kind of peanut butter. He sued because the prison had
incorrectly debited his prison account $2.50 under the following circum-
stances. He had ordered two jars of peanut butter; one sent by the canteen
was the wrong kind, and a guard had quite willingly taken back the wrong
product and assured the prisoner that the item he had ordered and paid for
would be sent the next day. Unfortunately, the authorities transferred the
prisoner that night to another prison, and his prison account remained
charged $2.50 for the item that he had ordered but had never received.
Jon 0. Newman, Pro Se Prisoner Litigation: Looking for Needles in Haystacks, 62 BROOK. L.
REV. 519, 521 (1996).
10 See id. at 520-22.
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to the federal courts under § 1983. When the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA) of 199511 was passed in 1996,12 the prevailing
thought was that prisoner litigation would be curtailed significantly.
1 3
Congress passed the Act in response to the increasing number of pris-
oner lawsuits being filed and their perceived collective frivolity. 14 An
initial examination of the Act's effects seemed to indicate that it had
been successful in decreasing the number of prisoner suits. 15 How-
ever, it is unclear whether this represents only a decrease in the
amount of frivolous prisoner suits, or whether the decrease has also
managed to keep legitimate claims out of federal court. 16
Although § 1983 prisoner litigation currently suffers from several
deficiencies that threaten to undermine the just result § 1983 seeks,
this Note does not advocate for a complete overhaul of the system.
Rather, it hopes to resolve one of the most glaring flaws in the current
system-the varying defenses afforded to private and public prison
guards. This Note proposes that courts abandon the doctrine of qual-
ified immunity and replace it with a good faith defense in the prisoner
litigation context. Such a shift would make it easier for prisoners with
meritorious claims to have their cases heard. Further, it would intro-
duce a measure of consistency and fairness with respect to prison
guard defendants in § 1983 lawsuits. This may be palatable to those
afraid of federal court inundation as the flooded courtroom con-
cern-a concern that helped justify the use of qualified immunity-
has been somewhat alleviated by the PLRA. Moreover, such a shift
11 Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321, 1366-77 (1996) (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 18, 28, 42 U.S.C.).
12 Though named the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, the Act was not
passed until 1996. For purposes of this Note, I will refer to the date included in the
title of the Act.
13 See MARGO SCHLANGER & GIOVANNA SHAY, PRESERVING THE RULE OF LAW IN
AMERICA'S PRISONS: THE CASE FOR AMENDING THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM AcT 1-2
(2007), http://www.acslaw.org/files/Schlanger%2OShay%20PLRA%2OPaper%203-
28-07.pdf.
14 See James B. Jacobs, Prison Reform Amid the Ruins of Prisoners' Rights, in THE
FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 179, 185 (Michael Tonry ed., 2004) (calling the PLRA
"[t] he most profound blow to the prisoners' rights movement," and stating that it was
"the political branches' effort[] to prevent the judiciary from recognizing and enforc-
ing prisoners' rights" by seeking "to deter prisoners from filing federal lawsuits"); see
also Cindy Chen, Note, The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Doing Away with More
Than Just Crunchy Peanut Butter, 78 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 203, 209-14 (2004) (arguing
that the PLRA was intended to curb the filing of prisoner lawsuits and has had the
effect of eroding prisoners' rights).
15 See Brian J. Ostrom et al., Congress, Courts and Corrections: An Empirical Perspective
on the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1525, 1526 (2003).
16 See SCHLANGER & SHAY, supra note 13, at 2.
2009]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
would further the important principles underlying § 1983 by remov-
ing the obstacles facing prisoners who allege violations of their consti-
tutional or federal statutory rights.
In Part I, this Note discusses the history and purposes of § 1983
litigation and the immunities and defenses available to defendants.
This Part lays the foundation upon which the remainder of the Note
will rely, specifically that the purposes of § 1983 dictate a reassessment
of the current prisoner litigation regime. Part II provides an overview
of the PLRA and reveals how its preliminary effects on prisoner litiga-
tion make it possible, in light of both the reasons for its passage and
the purposes of § 1983, to make the shift from qualified immunity to a
good faith defense. Finally, Part III examines the operation of § 1983
and the doctrine of qualified immunity with regard to prisoner litiga-
tion by performing a functional analysis on two Supreme Court cases:
Procunier v. Navarette7 and Richardson v. McKnight.18 This Part argues
that there is no meaningful distinction between public and private
prison guards and, as such, both should be treated similarly with
regard to § 1983 litigation. Ultimately, this Part concludes that while
both sets of guards should be amenable to suit under § 1983, neither
should be entitled to qualified immunity in its current form.
I. SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: HISTORY, PURPOSES, REQUIREMENTS,
AND DEFENSES
What is now 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was first passed as part of Section 1
of the Ku Klux Klan (Civil Rights) Act of 1871.19 Though the statute
remained largely unutilized for nearly its first hundred years of exis-
tence, the Supreme Court in Monroe v. Pape2O breathed life into
§ 1983, acknowledging that the statute provided a cause of action for
the vindication of federal statutory and constitutional rights. 2 1 Con-
gress enacted the statute in the wake of the Civil War largely due to
17 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
18 521 U.S. 399 (1997).
19 Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000)).
20 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978).
21 See id. at 180 ("[T]he legislation was passed ... to afford a federal right in
federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or other-
wise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of
fights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might
be denied by the state agencies."). Monell overruled the second holding in Monroe,
which stated that the City of Chicago could not be held liable in a § 1983 action.
Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. Monell thus broadened the scope of potential defendants in a
§ 1983 suit to include municipalities. Id.
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conditions in the southern states where state laws protecting individ-
ual rights were not enforced equally with regard to former slaves.
22
According to the Court, § 1983 targets the "'[m]isuse of power, pos-
sessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the
wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law."' 2 3 The remain-
der of this Part delves into the purposes and mechanics of a § 1983
suit. Subpart A discusses the purposes of litigation under § 1983.
This subpart also sets forth the mechanics of a § 1983 suit by setting
forth the statute's requirements. Subpart B describes the various
immunities (absolute and qualified), and defenses (good faith) associ-
ated with § 1983 suits, and introduces some of the conflict involved
with their application.
A. Purposes and Requirements of a § 1983 Suit
The general purposes underlying § 1983 litigation are deterring
officials from using their positions to deprive individuals of their
rights protected by the Constitution or federal statutes,24 and provid-
ing victims of such deprivations with a remedy in federal court.
25
While the drafters of the statute clearly had the plight of former slaves
close to mind, 26 the statute provides a federal cause of action for any
person who has been deprived of her federally protected rights by a
defendant acting under color of state law. 27 The fact that it provides a
federal cause of action is significant, especially from a historical point
of view, because the statute interposes (theoretically) a more neutral
22 See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183.
23 See id. at 184 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)). In
addition to essentially resurrecting § 1983 litigation, the Monroe decision also stood
for the proposition that a defendant in a § 1983 suit could be someone acting under
color of state law and engaging in unauthorized misconduct. Previously, liability was
limited to government officials acting within the scope of their authority. See The
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883) ("[C] ivil rights, such as are guaranteed by the
Constitution against State aggression, cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of indi-
viduals, unsupported by State authority ....").
24 See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 243 (1974) (citing Monroe, 365 U.S. at
171-72).
25 See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-57 (1978). Put differently, § 1983 is
meant to "deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individ-
uals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deter-
rence fails." Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992) (citing Carey, 435 U.S. at 254-57
(1978)).
26 For an extensive analysis of the legislative history behind § 1983, see Justice
Douglas' majority opinion in Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172-87.
27 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). The statute provides an avenue for the redress of
injuries that likely occurred only because the defendant was cloaked with the state's
authority. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183.
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arbiter in these cases where the defendant is, in some manner, a rep-
resentative of the state.
28
To sufficiently make out a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must first be
able to show that she has been deprived of some right protected by
the Constitution or federal law.29 Second, the plaintiff must show that
the alleged deprivation occurred under color of law, meaning that the
defendant acted either (1) with the power of the state behind him, or
(2) with the apparent power of the state behind him.30 Regardless of
the identity or legal status of the named defendant in a § 1983 case,
the plaintiff must demonstrate that the person acted under color of a
state "statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage.1
3 1
Significantly, the second showing does not require that the defen-
dant acted in an official capacity on behalf of the state. According to
the Supreme Court, in certain circumstances, private parties can act
under color of law.32 However, private parties simply following a law,
28 One of the supporting reasons the statute's proponents put forth was that state
courts were unable or unwilling to enforce their own laws, especially with respect to
the former slaves. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 176 (" 'That the State courts in the several
States have been unable to enforce the criminal laws of their respective States or to
suppress the disorders existing . . . is a sufficient reason why Congress should ...
enact the laws necessary for the protection of citizens of the United States."' (quoting
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 653 (1871) (statement of Sen. Osborn))). Given
the provision of this federal cause of action, it follows that a prospective § 1983 plain-
tiff may be more likely to pursue her claim in a forum where she feels she has a better
chance for redressing her injury.
29 42 U.S.C. § 1983. While as a matter of pleading, it would seem that simply
alleging a deprivation of a constitutionally protected right is sufficient for § 1983 pur-
poses, it is important in current qualified immunity jurisprudence whether or not the
right was clearly established at the time of the alleged deprivation. See Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
30 See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966) ("In cases under § 1983,
'under color' of law has consistently been treated as the same thing as the 'state
action' required under the Fourteenth Amendment.").
31 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
32 See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939-41 (1982); Adickes v.
S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970); see also Sheila M. Lombardi, Note, Media
in the Spotlight: Private Parties Liable for Violating the Fourth Amendment, 6 ROGER Wl-
LIAMS U. L. REV. 393 (2000) (presenting a collection of conflicting cases detailing
under which circumstances a private person, namely a member of the media, may be
acting under color of law while on a police "ride-along" program). In Lugar, the
Court cited four instances in which the Supreme Court had held that private actors
could be said to act under color of law: (1) where the private actor engages in an
activity that was traditionally an exclusively public function; (2) where there was state
compulsion on the private actor; (3) the "nexus" test; and (4) where there is joint
action between the private actor and the state. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939.
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without "something more," do not act under color of law.33 In any
case, the court will engage in an intensely fact-specific analysis as to
whether the private party's action was sufficiently transformed into
state action for purposes of a § 1983 suit.34 If it finds that someone
acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a constitu-
tional or federal right, the court must then analyze what immunities
or defenses are available to the defendant.
B. Immunities and Defenses to § 1983 Suits
Despite the fact that § 1983 fails to mention any defenses in its
text,35 the Supreme Court has consistently allowed for some form of
immunity to be asserted if the "tradition of immunity was so firmly
rooted in the common law and was supported by such strong policy
reasons that 'Congress would have specifically so provided had it
wished to abolish the doctrine.'"36 As a general matter, a § 1983
defendant today can assert immunity if someone similarly situated
when the 1871 Act was passed would have been able to assert immu-
nity and if policy concerns dictate continuing the immunity.3 7 Thus,
possible immunities and defenses to a § 1983 suit vary depending on
the defendant's status or position.
1. Absolute Immunity
Traditionally, absolute immunity from civil damages has been
accorded to legislators,38 judges, 39 and prosecutors40 so long as they
33 See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939.
34 See id.
35 See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976) ("[Section 1983] creates a
species of tort liability that on its face admits of no immunities. .. ").
36 Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 637 (1980) (quoting Pierson v.
Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967)); see also Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 163-64 (1992) ("If
parties seeking immunity were shielded from tort liability when Congress enacted the
Civil Rights Act of 1871-§ 1 of which is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983-we infer from
legislative silence that Congress did not intend to abrogate such immunities when it
imposed liability for actions taken under color of state law.").
37 See Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 164; City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247,
259 (1981) (illustrating the conflicting policies of § 1983 and immunity, observing
that "because the 1871 Act was designed to expose state and local officials to a new
form of liability, it would defeat the promise of the statute to recognize any pre-
existing immunity without determining both the policies that it serves and its compat-
ibility with the purposes of § 1983").
38 See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372 (1951) (recognizing absolute
immunity for legislators).
39 See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988) (recognizing absolute immu-
nity for judges).
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were performing what the Court determined to be "core" functions of
their positions.41 The Supreme Court has usually justified the recog-
nition of absolute immunity in terms of public policy. For example, in
Tenney v. Brandhove,42 the Court stated that "[1] egislators are immune
from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duty,
not for their private indulgence but for the public good. One must
not expect uncommon courage even in legislators. '43
Absolute immunity stems from the Court's belief that certain
public positions require such important discretionary functions that
those who occupy them should be allowed to discharge their duties
without fearing that their decisions, which may turn out to be wrong
or harmful, could subject them to a future lawsuit.44 Without the
immunity, legislators, judges, and prosecutors may perform their jobs
too timidly to be effective. Moreover, the Court has worried that qual-
ified people may be dissuaded from seeking out these and other pub-
lic service positions due to fear of civil liability.45 For the above-
mentioned classes of possible defendants, courts have concluded that
these concerns outweigh the purposes and policies underlying § 1983.
However, mindful that granting absolute immunity for any potential
defendant based on these concerns would make § 1983 an empty
shell, the courts have limited the application of absolute immunity to
these narrow classes of defendants.
40 See, e.g., Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 493 (1991) (recognizing absolute immu-
nity for prosecutors for acts "'intimately associated with the judicial phase of the crim-
inal process"' (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430)).
41 See Robert G. Schaffer, Note, The Public Interest in Private Party Immunity:
Extending Qualified Immunity from 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to Private Prisons, 45 DuKE L.J. 1049,
1058 (1996).
42 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
43 Id. at 377.
44 See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422-23 (1976). Imbler provided
that:
The common-law immunity of a prosecutor is based upon the same consid-
erations that underlie the common-law immunities of judges and grand
jurors acting within the scope of their duties. These include concern that
harassment by unfounded litigation would cause a deflection of the prosecu-
tor's energies from his public duties, and the possibility that he would shade
his decisions instead of exercising the independence of judgment required
by his public trust.
Id. (footnote omitted).
45 See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 320 (1975) (stating, in the context
of recognizing qualified immunity for school board members, that "[t]he most capa-
ble candidates for school board positions might be deterred from seeking office if
heavy burdens upon their private resources from monetary liability were a likely pros-




Qualified immunity, like absolute immunity, provides protection
for those acting under color of state law from civil liability, though it
does not function as a total bar to suit. The Court has generally
afforded this kind of immunity to government officers whose duties
include the exercise of significant discretion. 46 Among those who
have been granted qualified immunity are police officers, 4 7 state
prison guards, 48 school board members,49 and FBI agents, 50 to name a
few.
Early decisions involving qualified immunity, such as Scheuer v.
Rhodes,51 relied on both the subjective good faith of the actor and an
objective standard of reasonableness.5 2 The Scheuer Court set forth
the following reasons justifying the grant of qualified immunity to the
governor and state officials in Ohio who were sued as a result of their
roles in the 1971 Kent State shooting:
(1) the injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, of subject-
ing to liability an officer who is required, by the legal obligations of his
position, to exercise discretion; [and] (2) the danger that the threat of
such liability would deter his willingness to execute his office with
the decisiveness and the judgment required by the public good.
53
These are fair justifications, and under the Scheuer formulation, a
balance was struck between the policies underlying § 1983 and public
policy-specifically, that those who are deprived of their rights by
someone acting under color of law would have a method for redress,
and the interests of those acting for the public in being free from civil
liability where (1) the officer had a good faith belief that his actions
were constitutional, and (2) there were reasonable grounds for the
belief.
46 See Schaffer, supra note 41, at 1058 (citing the "important governmental func-
tion that the official is required to perform" as the reason for the grant of immunity,
not as a "reward for holding public office or any sympathy that the courts have for
governmental officials").
47 See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 556-57 (1967).
48 See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561-62 (1978).
49 See Wood, 420 U.S. at 321.
50 See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638-41 (1987).
51 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
52 See id. at 247-48 ("It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief
formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith
belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity . .
53 Id. at 240 (emphasis added).
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The Court altered its test for qualified immunity, however, in
Harlow v. Fitzgerald.54 Here, the Court eliminated the subjective ele-
ment of the test.55 Now, when assessing whether qualified immunity is
appropriate in a § 1983 claim, the Court will analyze whether the
actor's conduct violated a clearly established right, and whether a rea-
sonable person in the actor's position would have known of that
right.56 So long as the official did not violate a clearly established
right of which he should have known, the official enjoys qualified
immunity. The change to the qualified immunity standard was delib-
erate, reflecting the Court's attempt to fix the flaws found in the
Scheuer test. According to Harlow, the new requirement that a right be
clearly established stemmed from the judgment that officials should
not be forced to anticipate the development of constitutional law.
57
The Court also stated that the public good would be better served if
an official facing a decision, the consequences of which could deprive
a person of his or her constitutional or statutory rights, acted indepen-
dently and "'without fear of consequences.' "
58
The subjective element of the test was rejected, it seems, largely
out of a desire to limit litigation costs and disruption of government
functions, as it is difficult and time consuming to confirm the subjec-
tive motivations of an actor.59 Under Harlow, district courts do not
permit discovery until the threshold question of whether a clearly
established constitutional or statutory right was violated has been
54 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
55 See id. at 818.
56 See id. ("We therefore hold that government officials performing discretionary
functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their con-
duct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known."). As the test currently stands, this analysis is a
rigid two-step process. First, the Court makes an assessment on whether the alleged
conduct violated a clearly established right, and only if the answer to that question is
"yes" will the Court decide whether a reasonable actor would have known of that
right. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2001). This rigid construction may
not be the law for long, however, as the Court in granting certiorari in Pearson v.
Callahan asked the parties to brief and argue "[w]hether the Court's decision in Sau-
cier v. Katz should be overruled?" Pearson v. Callahan, 128 S. Ct. 1702, 1702-03
(2008) (citation omitted).
57 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19.
58 Id. at 819 (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)).
59 See id. at 816-17 (discussing the costs of subjective inquiries, and stating that
"jj]udicial inquiry into subjective motivation therefore may entail broad-ranging dis-
covery and the deposing of numerous persons, including an official's professional
colleagues. Inquiries of this kind can be peculiarly disruptive of effective govern-
ment" (footnote omitted)).
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answered.60 The Court's rationale for eliminating the subjective anal-
ysis and prohibiting discovery until the threshold question is answered
was that "bare allegations of malice should not suffice to subject gov-
ernment officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-
reaching discovery."61 As is discussed in Part II, this concern has
arguably been addressed through other developments in prisoner
litigation.
In its current form, qualified immunity is available to state offi-
cials in positions where the exercise of discretion is an integral part of
the position. Ultimately, under the current test, a defendant is enti-
tled to qualified immunity if he did not violate a clearly established
constitutional or federal statutory right of which he reasonably should
have known.
3. A Good Faith Defense
The question that has caused some confusion regards whether a
private actor, who may be acting under color of state law for purposes
of § 1983, is entitled to assert the same qualified immunity defense as
his state-employed counterpart. The Supreme Court twice has held
that private actors, though acting under color of state law for purposes
of § 1983, are unable to assert qualified immunity.62 The Court in
Wyatt v. Cold53 reasoned that qualified immunity is actually meant to
protect the public through its protection of the government, even
though the government's agents receive the benefit of not being held
liable for damages in a § 1983 suit.64 At the close of the majority's
opinion in Richardson v. McKnight, however, the Court left open the
possibility of a good faith defense for private actors in a § 1983 suit.
65
This suggested good faith defense stemmed from earlier incarna-
tions of qualified immunity that analyzed the subjective intent of the
defendant in determining whether the immunity was granted in a
60 Id. at 818-19. For a closer examination of how the Harlow standard has been
applied, see Teressa E. Ravenell, Hammering in Screws: Why the Court Should Look Beyond
Summary Judgment When Resolving § 1983 Qualified Immunity Disputes, 52 VILL. L. REv.
135, 142-49 (2007).
61 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817-18.
62 Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 412 (1997) (holding that there is no
qualified immunity for prison guards working in a privately run prison); Wyatt v. Cole,
504 U.S. 158, 168-69 (1992) (holding that there is no qualified immunity for private
persons who invoked a state replevin, garnishment, or attachment statute); see infra
Part III.B.
63 504 U.S. 158 (1992).
64 Id. at 167-68.
65 521 U.S. at 413-14.
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given case. 66 In his dissent in Procunier v. Navarette, Justice Stevens
shaped a good faith standard such that the official would sacrifice his
qualified immunity67 if he knew or should have known that his official
conduct would violate the plaintiffs constitutional rights, or if the offi-
cial acted with malice or with intent to cause injury.6s Unhelpfully,
the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on whether this kind of affirma-
tive defense would be available for a private actor sued under § 1983
in lieu of qualified immunity.
If it were met with approval, there are a number of ways in which
a good faith defense could operate. As an initial matter, the good
faith defense would protect those private individuals who acted with
the reasonable belief that their actions were legal, and whose actions
were neither motivated by malice nor an intent to injure. The next
question is on whom the burden of proof would rest, and on this ques-
tion, the courts are conflicted. 69 Dicta in Harlow provides guidance
for how the Supreme Court might answer this question-namely,
placing the burden on the plaintiff so as to avoid the situation where
"bare allegations of malice" would be enough to subject a defendant
to the costs of discovery and trial.70 This stance, however, can operate
unjustly, as there is obvious difficulty in proving a negative. Specifi-
cally, requiring the plaintiff to prove that the defendant did not act in
good faith is quite problematic because the defendant is the ultimate
repository of truth on that question. 71 The better solution could be
an affirmative good faith defense, which would place the burden on
the defendant to set forth the reasons for his actions.72
As of yet, a good faith defense for private actors in § 1983 suits,
though discussed, has not been approved explicitly by the Supreme
Court. The Court should approve of the defense for these actors as a
matter of fairness. If these actors can be held liable under § 1983,
66 See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974).
67 As Procunierwas decided before Harlow, the subjective intent and good faith of
the official were still relevant to Justice Stevens' discussion of qualified immunity. See
Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 568-74 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
68 See id. at 571.
69 See generally Mark N. Ohrenberger, Note, Prison Privatization and the Development
of "Good Faith" Defense for Private-Party Defendants to 42 U.S. C. § 1983 Actions, 13 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1035, 1047-54 (2005) (discussing the various ways courts have
assigned the burden of proof for a good faith defense in § 1983 suits).
70 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817 (1982).
71 Furthermore, assuming the defendant did act in good faith, requiring him to
set forth such supporting facts does not seem too onerous as to weigh against placing
the burden on the defendant. Also, for a discussion on the power of the district
courts to dismiss meritless prisoner lawsuits, see Part II, infra.
72 The affirmative defense approach is suggested in Part III.D infia.
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they should be able to assert a defense similar to state actors sued
under § 1983. The question remains, however, whether the current
set of immunities, even with a good faith defense for private actors, is
the best paradigm for § 1983 prisoner litigation.
II. THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT AND ITS EFFECT ON
PRISONER LITIGATION
Congress enacted the PLRA in an attempt to limit the amount of
supposedly frivolous prisoner lawsuits being brought in federal
court.73 While the PLRA has certainly achieved its primary purpose, it
also has erected significant obstacles for prisoners filing meritorious
claims.7 4 The immediately observable effects of the Act seem to show
that it has succeeded in decreasing the number of prisoner suits
brought under § 1983. 75 Subpart A gives a brief overview of the new
wrinkles the PLRA has added to prisoner litigation. These changes
include new requirements on prisoners, such as filing fees for indi-
gent prisoners and administrative remedy exhaustion, while also giv-
ing the district courts greater flexibility in their power to dismiss suits.
Subpart B discusses how the effects of the Act, namely a decreased
prisoner litigation docket, may make it more palatable for courts to
replace qualified immunity with a good faith affirmative defense.
A. Requirements of the PLRA
The PLRA imposes a number of requirements on prisoners by
way of six filing provisions.76 These provisions all complicate a pris-
oner's attempt to file a suit. For purposes of this Note, the four appli-
73 See SCHLANGER & SHAY, supra note 13, at 1.
74 See id. at 1-2 (arguing that the PLRA is "undermining the rule of law in
America's prisons," and that it is "'prevent[ing] inmates from raising legitimate
claims"' (alteration in original) (quoting 141 CONG. REc. S14,627 (daily ed. Sept. 29,
1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch))); see also Ann H. Mathews, Note, The Inapplicability
of the Prison Litigation Reform Act to Prisoner Claims of Excessive Force, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv.
536, 546-47 (2002) ("Though the PLRA purportedly prevents only frivolous claims
from being heard by federal courts, the Act actually creates serious obstacles to all
prisoner claims .. " (foonote omitted)). This Part does not endeavor to assess all of
the elements of the PLRA, nor does it argue the constitutionality of the Act. What
this Part does is introduce some of the Act's basic elements and discuss how the
effects of the Act as observed thus far have, as a practical matter, changed the land-
scape of prisoner litigation, making more palatable the introduction of a good faith
affirmative defense standard to prisoner § 1983 litigation.
75 See, e.g., Ostrom et al., supra note 15, at 1537 ("[T]he most obvious change
[following the passage of the Act], of course, has been the rapid and precipitous
decline in the volume of prisoner litigation.").
76 See Mathews, supra note 74, at 547-48.
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cable provisions will be discussed. First, indigent prisoners are
required to pay filing fees. 77 Second, the trial court "may dismiss a
prisoner's claim sua sponte if the court determines that... the action
is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim. '78 Third, what is known
as the "three strikes" rule prohibits a prisoner who has had three
actions dismissed under the second filing provision from proceeding
in forma pauperis without demonstrating he or she is in "imminent
danger of serious physical injury. '79 Most onerously, the fourth provi-
sion requires a prisoner wishing to bring suit with regard to prison
conditions to exhaust the administrative remedies available in his
prison before filing suit.80 This provision is quite serious, as the
Supreme Court has held that the PLRA bars "even meritorious claims
from court if an inmate has failed to comply with all of the many tech-
nical requirements of the prison or jail grievance system."' 81 In the
twelve years since the passage of the PLRA, these provisions have had
a significant effect on prisoner litigation.
B. Preliminary Effects of the PLRA on Prisoner Litigation
Since the PLRA was passed, the number of prisoner lawsuits filed
in federal court has decreased substantially.8 2 For example, inmate
suits filed in 2005 numbered eleven per thousand inmates, compared
with the twenty-six suits per thousand inmates in 1995, immediately
preceding the passage of the PLRA. 83 This can mean any number of
things, but a few of the possibilities are worth discussing. First, this
77 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (1) (2006).
78 Mathews, supra note 74, at 548 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) (1) (2000)).
79 28 U.S.C. § 19 15(g) (2006).
80 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2000). This exhaustion requirement may be the most
controversial of the filing provisions and has been attacked by various groups and
authors. See, e.g., Stop Prisoner Rape, SPR Fact Sheet: The Prison Litigation Reform
Act Obstructs Justice for Survivors of Sexual Abuse in Detention (Oct. 2007), http://
www. spr.org/en/factsheets/Prison % 20Litigation % 20Reform % 2OAct.pdf (discussing
how the exhaustion requirement "has prevented scores of prisoner rape survivors
from seeking redress"); see also SCrHLANCER & SHAY, supra note 13, at 3 ("[T]he PLRA's
provision barring federal lawsuits by inmate plaintiffs who have failed to comply with
their prisons' internal grievance procedures-no matter how onerous, futile, or dan-
gerous such compliance might be for them. This obstructs rather than incentivizes
constitutional oversight of prison conditions.").
81 SCHLANGER & SHAY, supra note 13, at 8 (citing Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct.
2378 (2006)).
82 See Ostrom et al., supra note 15, at 1541-44.
83 See Schlanger & Shay, supra note 13, at 2 (citing ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 131 tbl.C-2A (1997), availa-
ble at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicial-business/c2asep97.pdf, ADMIN OFFICE OF THE
U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 166 tbI.C-2A (2006)).
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could mean that the decrease was largely in frivolous suits that would
have been filed, in which case the PLRA is having its intended effect.
If this is the case, that means that the cases that do get filed are likely
meritorious, which in turn creates a greater impetus for protecting
the ability of those inmates who file such suits to have their cases
heard. Another possibility is that the decrease represents both frivo-
lous and meritorious claims that were not filed because of the onerous
requirements of the Act. If this is the case, the PLRA is having a
broader, detrimental effect on prisoner litigation.
84
One way to ensure that the inmates who file meritorious suits are
given a chance for redress is to replace qualified immunity with a
good faith affirmative defense. From a practical standpoint, this is a
feasible proposition, as the decrease in prisoner suits should free up
the courts to deal more comprehensively with the suits that are filed.
Combining this decrease in cases filed with the ability of the district
courts to dismiss sua sponte claims that appear frivolous, malicious, or
meritless,8 5 the courts should, in light of the purposes of § 1983,86
discard qualified immunity in prisoner § 1983 litigation in favor of a
good faith affirmative defense. Doing so will enable prisoners with
meritorious claims to get past summary judgment and have their
issues heard in court. This will help provide an effective constitu-
tional check on the prison system and its officers.
The benefits of this switch to a good faith defense would not run
solely to prisoners. A good faith defense aims to protect those who
are not at fault, regardless of their employer. It is strikingly unfair to
hold a guard liable for violating a prisoner's constitutional rights,
given the nature of prisons and the interactions between the inmates
and guards, where the guard honestly and reasonably believes that his
conduct was constitutional.87 A good faith defense protects those
84 There is support for the idea that the PLRA is preventing inmates from raising
legitimate claims. See id. ("The shrunken inmate docket is less successful than before
the PLRA's enactment; more cases are dismissed, and fewer settle. An important
explanation is that constitutionally meritorious cases are now faced with new and
often insurmountable obstacles." (footnote omitted)).
85 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
86 See supra Part I.A.
87 See Sheldon Nahmod, The Emerging Section 1983 Private Party Defense, 26 CAR-
Dozo L. REv. 81, 91 (2004) (arguing that, in the context of a private party-good faith
defense, there is "unfairness [in] imposing damages liability on private defendants
whose honest and reasonable belief in the constitutionality of their conduct turns out
later to have been mistaken"). This analysis should be applied to publicly employed
prison guards as well-there is no reason to believe that it would be more just to hold
liable a publicly employed prison guard for violating a clearly established right of
which he should have known, who honestly and reasonably believed in the constitu-
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whose jobs require the exercise of discretion in delicate, dangerous
situations; as far as liability is concerned, a guard would need only to
articulate the reasons or set of circumstances that led him to choose
the action he did, regardless of the legal state of the constitutional
right at the time he acted. The guard who acts with malice and the
guard who tries to circumvent the rules will not be protected, while
the guard who makes a reasonable determination in good faith will
not face damages liability. Such a fault-based system promotes a bet-
ter-functioning justice system.
The PLRA has succeeded in decreasing the amount of prisoner
lawsuits filed in federal courts. The greatest danger in allowing this
pattern to continue is that meritorious prisoner suits may not be
heard in federal court, thus potentially leaving a vulnerable class of
plaintiffs without meaningful opportunity for redress. Such a result is
contrary to the purposes and goals of § 1983.
III. PRISONER § 1983 LITIGATION
The fact that § 1983 suits frequently arise from a prison context is
not surprising, as just about every action taken by prison officials can
be considered done under color of state law by virtue of their position
and function. Additionally, prisons are not, nor are they meant to be,
pleasant environments. As such, prison conditions give rise to numer-
ous inmate complaints that may be phrased as deprivations of the
inmates' constitutional or federal statutory rights. Subpart A analyzes
a Supreme Court decision in a § 1983 suit brought against prison
guards in a state prison, and discusses the Court's recognition of qual-
ified immunity in this context. Subpart B analyzes a Supreme Court
decision in a § 1983 suit brought against prison guards in a privately
run prison, and discusses the Court's decision not to recognize quali-
fied immunity for these guards. Subpart C analyzes Justice Scalia's
dissent in the privately run prison case in which he applied a func-
tional analysis to determine that the private prison guards should be
entitled to assert qualified immunity. Finally, this Part will argue that,
combining a functional analysis with the overriding purposes of
§ 1983, neither private nor state prison guards should be entitled to
assert qualified immunity to a § 1983 suit; rather, they should be able
to assert an affirmative good faith defense.
tionality of his actions. If the guard honestly and reasonably believed his actions were
constitutional and the right he violated was clearly established, the fault lies with the
employer for not having properly trained its guards, and in such a situation it is the
employer-the state or a private firm-that should be held liable.
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A. Prisoner Lawsuits Against State Prison Officials:
Procunier v. Navarette
The Supreme Court took up the issue of whether state prison
guards are entitled to assert qualified immunity from suit in a § 1983
action in Procunier v. Navarette. In Procunier, Navarette was a prisoner
in a California state prison who charged six prison officials with con-
duct that allegedly violated his constitutional rights.8 8 Three of the six
implicated in the suit were subordinate officials who were charged
with, among other things, a "knowing disregard" for Navarette's First,
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.89 The other three were
supervisors, alleged to have conspired with and knowingly condoned
the subordinates' conduct. 90 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
in the case to determine "[w] hether negligent failure to mail certain
of a prisoner's outgoing letters states a cause of action under section
1983."9 ' Additionally, the Court agreed to determine whether the
prison officers and officials were entitled to assert any kind of immu-
nity defense.
92
88 Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 556 (1978). Justice Stevens' dissenting
opinion spells out the facts alleged by Navarette more fully:
These claims tell us that prison officials prevented Navarette from corre-
sponding with legal assistance groups, law students, the news media, per-
sonal friends, and other inmates .... Some of this mail was deliberately
confiscated ... and some was mishandled simply because the guards were
careless in performing their official duties.
Id. at 570 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
89 See id. at 557-58 (majority opinion).
90 See id. at 558.
91 Id. at 559 n.6 (internal quotation marks omitted). Following the pattern in
these cases, the Court defined the right narrowly.
92 See id. at 560-63. The Court stated that it was necessary to determine whether,
at the time of the events alleged, Navarette's mailing privileges were constitutionally
protected and whether the guards knew or should have known that their alleged con-
duct violated that protected right. Id. at 559-60 & n.6 (citing as authority Sup. CT. R.
23.1 (c) which treats questions on subsidiary issues as "'fairly comprised' by the ques-
tion presented"). The Court also stated that its power to decide "is not limited by the
precise terms of the question presented." Id. at 560 n.6 (citing Blonder-Tongue
Labs., Inc., v. Univ. of I11. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 320 n.6 (1971)).
In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger took issue with the majority's treatment of
qualified immunity in the first instance, as he stated that the issue was not properly
before the Court. Id. at 566-67 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also dis-
sented from the case. He argued that the Court's treatment of immunity was unwise
in this case because there had not been sufficient development of the record. He
stated that this was important because a more fully developed record might not have
"completely foreclose [d] the possibility that the plaintiff might be able to disprove a
good-faith defense that has not yet even been pleaded properly." Id. at 574 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). It is worth noting that Procunierwas decided before the current test for
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The controlling test at this time was articulated in Wood v. Strick-
land.93 To determine whether the officials were entitled to qualified
immunity under the Wood standard, the first inquiry is whether the
allegedly violated constitutional right was clearly established at the
time of the conduct.9 4 The follow-up inquiry is whether the defend-
ants "knew or should have known of that right, and if they knew or
should have known that their conduct violated the constitutional
norm. '9 5 The Court, in this case, agreed with the prison officials and
officers that "in 1971 and 1972 when the conduct involved in this case
took place there was no established First Amendment right protecting
the mailing privileges of state prisoners and that hence there was no
such federal right about which they should have known." 96 The Court
similarly agreed with the prison officials as to the second Wood
inquiry, which gives no protection where "the official has acted with
'malicious intention' to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right
or to cause him 'other injury."' 9 7 The Court concluded that the
qualified immunity was approved in Harlow. See supra notes 46-60 and accompanying
text.
93 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
94 See Procunier, 434 U.S. at 562 (citing Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322
(1975), 420 U.S. at 322).
95 Id. The rationale for this second prong was expressed in Pierson v. Ray, where
the Court stated that an executive official cannot be expected to predict the future of
constitutional law. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967).
96 Procunier, 434 U.S. at 562-63.
97 Id. at 566 (quoting Wood, 420 U.S. at 322). Though the Court disposed of this
point rather quickly, Justice Stevens' dissent discussed how Navarette's allegation,
undeveloped in the record, included that some of his mail was "deliberately confis-
cated because the guards regarded Navarette as a troublesome 'writ-writer."' Id. at
570 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Interestingly, this language, "a troublesome writ-writer," illuminates one of the
major purposes underlying the PLRA-stopping prisoners like Navarette from contin-
uously filing supposedly frivolous lawsuits. See supra Part II.A. In all likelihood, the
effects of the PLRA would have made Navarette's filing this suit more difficult.
Navarette's suit was not frivolous on a number of counts. For one, there was
sufficient authority within the circuit to convince the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit that there was some constitutionally protected fight regarding a prisoner's
mail and that Navarette had pled sufficiently to survive summary judgment. See Nava-
rette v. Enomoto, 536 F.2d 277, 279-80 (9th Cir. 1976) ("A prisoner does not shed his
first amendment right to free expression upon entering the prison gates .... [W]e
think Navarette's allegations, although inartfully worded, permit proof entitling him
to relief." (citing McKinney v. DeBord, 507 F.2d 501, 505 (9th Cir. 1974); Seattle-
Tacoma Newspaper Guild, Local # 82 v. Parker, 480 F.2d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 1973)),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978). Though
the Supreme Court determined that there was no basis for the guards to have reason-
ably known about such a right and that they did not act with disregard for such a right
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prison officials in question here did not act maliciously or with intent
to cause injury, and thus were entitled to qualified immunity.98
B. Prisoner Lawsuits Against Private Prison Officials:
Richardson v. McKnight
The Supreme Court took up the issue of whether private prison
guards are entitled to assert qualified immunity in a § 1983 action in
Richardson v. McKnight. Ronnie McKnight was a prisoner in a private
correctional facility in Tennessee who brought suit against two prison
guards, Richardson and Walker. 99 McKnight filed a § 1983 suit alleg-
ing that the guards, while acting under color of law,100 inflicted a
physical injury upon him by placing him in "extremely tight physical
restraints."' 01 The guards contended that they were entitled to quali-
fied immunity and moved to dismiss.
10 2
Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer began by analyzing cer-
tain elements of the Court's decision in Wyatt v. Cole that were rele-
vant to the discussion in the present case. The factors pertinent to
this discussion were: (1) the reaffirmation that despite § 1983's main
purpose being the deterrence of state actors from using their authority
to deprive citizens of their rights, private parties may be liable under
§ 1983 in certain circumstances; and (2) that immunity from a § 1983
suit should be recognized where the immunity "'was... firmly rooted
in the common law,"' and where policy considerations were strong
enough in support of immunity that Congress would have specifically
provided that it was abolishing the doctrine had it wished to do so.I°0
that would amount to a lack of good faith, Navarette presented a legitimate question
for the Court to decide. See Procunier, 434 U.S. at 565. Admittedly, not all prisoner
lawsuits will present such questions meriting an answer from the Supreme Court, but
the animus against prisoner litigation that helped inspire the PLRA makes little of the
fact that some will. See supra Part II.
98 See Procunier, 434 U.S. at 566. Had this case come before the Court following
the adoption of the qualified immunity test in Harlow, the case likely would have been
decided similarly, as Harlow does not significantly change the analysis. See supra Part
I.C.2.
99 See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 401 (1997).
100 See supra note 32 and accompanying text (describing how and in what circum-
stances courts will hold that private parties act under color of law).
101 See Richardson, 521 U.S. at 401.
102 See id. at 401-02.
103 See Richardson, 521 U.S. at 403-04 (first citing Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 162
(1992) and then quoting id. at 164). Justice Breyer also found that Wyatt was limited
in its holding that private persons who conspire with state officials and invoke a state
replevin statute are not entitled to immunity. Id. at 404.
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The Court then undertook the typical qualified immunity analysis
by assessing the history of such immunity for private prison guards
and the policy concerns inherent in recognizing it today. Regarding
the historical analysis, Justice Breyer found no "firmly rooted" tradi-
tion of immunity applicable to private prison guards, even citing evi-
dence that the common law "provided mistreated prisoners in prison
leasing States with remedies against mistreatment by those private les-
sors."10 4 The policy concerns presented a closer question.1 0 5 The
main policy supporting qualified immunity as a general matter is its
promise to protect the "'government's ability to perform its tradi-
tional functions.' 1i06 Qualified immunity does this by (1) protecting
officials engaged in such discretionary activities so that they can fulfill
their responsibilities without fear of civil liability, and (2) not deter-
ring otherwise qualified individuals from public service. 10 7 The prison
guards in this case had a cogent argument for qualified immunity
based on this policy precedent, as they argued that they performed
the same functions and were subject to the same concerns as state
prison guards. 10 8
The Court rejected the guards' argument, however, first stating
that the performance of a government function is not enough to auto-
matically entitle someone to qualified immunity.' 0 9 Second, the
Court maintained that the competitive pressures of the marketplace
in which private prisons operate address the concern that the guards
104 See id. at 404-05.
105 See id. at 407-08.
106 See id. at 408 (quoting Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 167).
107 See id.; see also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978) (phrasing the pur-
pose of qualified immunity as protecting the public by "encouraging the vigorous
exercise of official authority"); Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)
(stating that the threat of civil liability would "dampen the ardor of all but the most
resolute, or the most irresponsible" and thus deter many qualified individuals from
public service).
108 See Richardson, 521 U.S. at 408.
109 See id. at 408-09. Justice Breyer took issue with a purely functional approach to
the determination of private party immunity, stating that private industry frequently
overlaps with government activities in areas such as energy production, waste disposal,
and mail delivery. Id. at 409. The distinguishing factor is that prison guards, privately
or publicly employed, exercise a different kind of discretion. It would seem that a
prison guard is in a position requiring the exercise of discretion that could potentially
infringe the constitutional rights of others by virtue of the job itself, whereas U.S.
postal workers and those who work for private mail delivery companies are not
engaged in similar activities. In other words, despite the large overlap generally
between government and industry, there does not appear to be such a great overlap
in the areas involving the kind of discretionary actions that have traditionally impli-
cated the policies behind qualified immunity.
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would perform their jobs too timidly: if a private prison employed
lackadaisical or timid guards, it would be in danger of having its con-
tract cancelled.110 Thus, the Court reasoned that private prisons
already have an incentive to ensure that their guards perform their
duties neither too harshly (lest they risk civil damages that would raise
costs), l I ' nor too timidly. Third, the Court stated that the nature of
private prisons addresses the deterrence with which qualified immu-
nity is concerned. Employees in the private sector may be paid more
or receive more benefits than their government-employed counter-
parts.'1 2 Also, at least in Tennessee, private prisons were required to
carry comprehensive insurance, which in turn increased the likeli-
hood that the private prison guards would be indemnified in the
event of a damage award against them.' 13 Therefore, according to the
Court, deterrence was not a major concern for private prison guards.
Finally, the Court discounted the worry that the threat of a lawsuit
would be a distraction for the guards, insisting that the possibility of
distraction was not "sufficient grounds for an immunity."
114
In conclusion, the Court reiterated that without a special reason
for such an extension of "governmental" immunity under § 1983 to
private prison guards, the Court would not grant such immunity
despite the fact that the guards may be liable under § 1983 like their
public counterparts. 115 The opinion closed with three caveats: (1) the
district court is to determine whether the private prison guards are
even liable under § 1983 as acting under color of state law; (2) the
holding is limited to this context, in that "a private firm, systematically
organized to assume a major lengthy administrative task (managing
an institution) with limited direct supervision by the government,
undertakes that task for profit and potentially in competition with
other firms"; and (3) that while qualified immunity is not available to
these defendants, a good faith defense may be available where a pri-
vate party faces § 1983 liability.116
110 See id. at 409.
111 See id.
112 Seeid. at 411.
113 See id.
114 See id.
115 See id. at 412 ("Since there are no special reasons significantly favoring an
extension of governmental immunity, and since Wyatt makes clear that private actors
are not automatically immune .... we must conclude that private prison guards ... do
not enjoy immunity from suit in a § 1983 case.").
116 Id. at 413.
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C. A Functional Approach
In his dissent in Richardson, Justice Scalia argued that the major-
ity's decision not to recognize qualified immunity for the private
prison officials is misguided, proposing that courts should apply a
"functional approach" to determine whether private parties are enti-
tied to assert qualified immunity to a § 1983 suit.117 Scalia began with
his own historical analysis and stated that the majority relied more on
the absence of a case recognizing immunity for private prison guards
than on any rejection of such immunity. 118 He further attacked the
majority's emphasis on history by stating that Procunier held that state
prison guards could assert qualified immunity despite a similarly
inconclusive history. 119 Justice Scalia then wrote that the principles
underlying a recognition of immunity "plainly cover the private prison
guard if they cover the nonprivate." 20 He defined the principles as
such: "(1) immunity is determined by function, not status, and (2)
even more specifically, private status is not disqualifying.' '12 1 By rely-
ing on a functional analysis, Justice Scalia seems to apply a similar
analytical framework to that which is used to determine whether to
hold a private actor liable under § 1983. That is, if a private actor can
be held liable under § 1983 as acting under color of state law for per-
forming a function that is traditionally or exclusively within the pur-
view of the state, it would follow that such an actor should have the
same defenses or immunities as is accorded to his state actor
counterpart.
117 Justice Scalia argued in dissent:
Today the Court declares that this immunity is unavailable to employees of
private prison management firms, who perform the same duties as state-
employed correctional officials, who exercise the most palpable form of state
police power, and who may be sued for acting "under color of state law."
This holding is supported neither by common-law tradition nor public pol-
icy, and contradicts our settled practice of determining § 1983 immunity on
the basis of the public function being performed.
Id. at 414 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
118 See id. at 414-15.
119 See id. at 415 (stating that there is a history of government-employed prison
officials who were "successfully sued at common law, often with no mention of possi-
ble immunity").
120 Id. at 416.
121 Id. Justices Breyer and Scalia argued as to the role of a functional analysis in
determining a grant of immunity. Justice Scalia cited numerous cases supporting the
proposition that the grant of any immunity rests on a functional analysis, see id. at
416-17, while Justice Breyer argued that a functional analysis was appropriate only to
the determination of whether to grant absolute or qualified immunity to a government
actor, see id. at 408 (majority opinion).
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Justice Scalia next addressed the policy considerations cited by
the majority against recognizing qualified immunity for private prison
guards by again applying a functional approach. He found that there
is no functional distinction between state and private prison guards.
He faulted the "market pressures" analysis as unavailing because poli-
ticians, who are subject to various influences unrelated to the open
market, make the decisions regarding which firms receive government
contracts for private prisons and whether a firm is retained to con-
tinue operating the prisons. 122 As such, he argued that market pres-
sures do not play an actual role in the running of private prisons
insofar as the actions of private prison guards are concerned.
He then addressed the theory that the availability of civil rights
liability insurance means that private prison guards do not need
immunity because the insurance would cover damages levied against
them in a § 1983 suit. Noting, however, that the insurance is available
to state prison guards as well, he pointed out that "governments [like]
private prison employers, [do not] have any need for § 1983 immu-
nity."' 23 Finally, Justice Scalia addressed an argument put forth by the
court of appeals that private prison guards are more likely to violate
prisoners' constitutional rights than are state prison guards because of
a profit motive. 124 He found that there was no support for that asser-
tion, and in fact seemed to think that private prison firms would be
more vigilant in training their guards because damages would be paid
by them, not by the public.125
The overarching theme of the Justice Scalia's dissent is that func-
tion should be the determinative factor in recognizing immunity:
Today's decision says that two sets of prison guards who are
indistinguishable in the ultimate source of their authority over pris-
oners .... in the powers that they possess over prisoners .... [and]
in the duties that they owe toward prisoners, are to be treated quite
differently in the matter of their financial liability.1 26
122 See id. at 418-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing how considerations of cost
and service in making these determinations regarding private prisons will likely be
pushed aside for considerations such as "personal friendship, political alliances, [and]
in-state ownership of the contractor"). Furthermore, Justice Scalia recognized that
the likely number one factor in the determination of which firm gets a private prison
contract is cost, not disciplinary record. As such, private prison managers possibly are
more in need of immunity than are state prison officials because private prisons might
choose to avoid strong discipline so as to keep their insurance rates low. See id.
123 See id. at 420-21.
124 See id. at 421-22. The majority of the Court did not address this question.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 422.
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Treating state and private prison guards similarly regarding quali-
fied immunity would produce an equitable result. It seems logical
that if private prison guards may be defendants in a § 1983 suit by
acting under color of state law, then it is only reasonable that they
should be afforded defenses similar to others who act under color of
state law. While Justice Scalia and the dissenters in Richardson would
recognize qualified immunity for private prison guards, when the
question is considered in light of the purposes and policies underlying
§ 1983 lawsuits, neither state nor private prison guards should be enti-
tled to assert qualified immunity. Rather, a good faith defense is more
appropriate and in line with the purposes and goals of § 1983.
D. A Good Faith Defense for All Prison Officials in § 1983 Suits
While § 1983 is meant to act as a method of redress for wrongs
done to individuals under color of state law, qualified immunity can
act as an effective bar to its achievement.' 27 Since determinations of
qualified immunity are supposed to occur before the discovery phase,
a § 1983 plaintiff who truly may have been wronged may never get to
present her case if the suit is resolved on summary judgment on the
issue of immunity. Of course, where an essentially meritless § 1983
suit is involved, qualified immunity operates to eliminate many of the
costs associated with litigating a § 1983 suit. However, utilizing an
affirmative good faith defense, instead of qualified immunity, will pro-
duce a more equitable result for both parties.
A serious problem with the Harlow qualified immunity standard is
that determinations of the immunity can turn on how broadly or nar-
rowly the district court construes the right that was allegedly violated.
Take for example the Fourth Circuit case Robles v. Prince George's
County.128 This case involved a plaintiff who was tied to a pole in an
empty parking lot late at night by police officers who had arrested him
on a traffic warrant. 29 Despite finding that the actions of the police
officers constituted a due process violation, the Fourth Circuit upheld
the district court's grant of qualified immunity by defining the scope
of the constitutional right inappropriately narrowly: because the right
not to be tied to a pole in a parking lot late at night by police officers
was not clearly established at the time of the action, the officers were
127 See, e.g., Denise Gilman, Calling the United States' Bluff" How Sovereign Immunity
Undermines the United States' Claim to an Effective Domestic Human Rights System, 95 GEO.
L.J. 591, 617 (2007).
128 302 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2002).
129 See id. at 267.
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allowed to assert qualified immunity. 130 It is not clear that the public
is better served by having these officers avoid liability for their actions
while the victim (whom the court acknowledged was a victim by agree-
ing that the actions constituted a due process violation), is left without
redress under the statute specifically designed for such a situation.
Applying a good faith defense standard to the facts of Robles cre-
ates a more equitable result. 3 1 The defendants would have been held
liable insofar as they knew or should have known, as police officers,
that by tying the plaintiff to a pole, they were depriving him of his due
process rights. In light of the nature of the defendants' actions, it
seems impossible that they acted with an honest, reasonable belief
that their actions were constitutional. Further, given the facts, it
seems as though the defendants intended to cause the plaintiff harm.
Under a good faith standard, the officers would not be able to escape
liability. The result under a good faith defense standard seems to be
more favorable to the public good. These results are also more consis-
tent with the purposes of § 1983 in that those deprived of their consti-
tutional or federal statutory rights by someone acting under color of
law have an avenue for redress.
While Robles dealt with police officers as the defendants, similar
circumstances arise in the prison context where guards are in constant
contact with, and have near absolute control over, prisoners. For
example, a different result occurred in Hope v. Pelzer.132 Here, the
prisoner-plaintiff was chained to a hitching post for seven hours
outside in the Alabama sun. He was given water no more than twice,
and was not allowed a visit to the bathroom as punishment for arguing
with prison guards. 133 Despite the inherently cruel nature of the act,
binding Eleventh Circuit precedent, an Alabama Department of Cor-
rections regulation, and a report from the Department of Justice to
the Alabama Department of Corrections that the use of a hitching
130 See id. at 270-71. The issue of what is "clearly established" for purposes of
§ 1983 litigation is another source of controversy in this area. The "clearest" guidance
given by the Supreme Court came in Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987), which
stated:
The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official
would understand that what he is doing violates that fight. This is not to say
that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very
action in question has previously been held unlawful; but it is to say that in
the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.
Id. at 640 (citation omitted).
131 See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
132 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
133 Id. at 734-35.
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post was not constitutional, 13 4 the court of appeals granted qualified
immunity to the guards. 135 The Supreme Court reversed, "readily
conclud[ing] that the respondents' conduct violated 'clearly estab-
lished statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.' ' ' 136 In this case, the current test for qualified
immunity applied to state prison guards almost produced an uncon-
scionable result. If the guards in Hape had been employed by a pri-
vate prison rather than by the State of Alabama, under current
jurisprudence, they may have been able to assert a good faith defense.
Under such a defense standard, however, it seems highly unlikely that
the court of appeals would have found that the guards should prevail
considering the malicious, retributive nature of their acts.
While a good faith affirmative defense may produce better results
for plaintiffs in a § 1983 suit, it can be argued that this paradigm
would also produce better results for the public. First, applying the
same standard for defenses to potential defendants in § 1983 suits,
regardless of whether their employer is the state or a private firm,
would produce consistent results based on similar factual circum-
stances. This would provide better guidance to both the courts that
decide these cases, as well as to prison officials in structuring their
training to ensure that those who exercise discretion over prisoners
are less likely to act in a prohibited manner. Second, providing a sys-
tem in which prisoners who can make out a meritorious claim under
§ 1983 can get beyond the summary judgment stage makes it more
likely that actual constitutional harms are redressed. This, in turn,
produces a system more consistent with the purposes and goals of
§ 1983. Third, the claim that otherwise qualified individuals would be
deterred from public service without the promise of qualified immu-
nity is somewhat dubious. If certain individuals are deterred from
serving as prison guards because of the threat of personal liability for
acting unreasonably in their duties or for acting in an intentionally
malicious manner, our justice system would be better served by those
individuals not taking law enforcement jobs.
13 7
134 Id. at 741-42.
135 Id. at 733. The court of appeals held that the actions constituted cruel and
unusual punishment, but held that since there was no precedent case with materially
similar facts, the guards were entitled to qualified immunity as the right was not
"clearly established." Id.
136 Id. at 742 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
137 The argument that the absence of qualified immunity will make officials hesi-
tant in the performance of their duties misses the point; under a good faith affirma-
tive defense paradigm, these officials will not be liable unless they acted unreasonably
or in an intentionally harmful way.
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For all of these reasons, private prison guards and state prison
guards should be treated similarly with respect to § 1983 defenses, and
the defense should be a good faith affirmative defense rather than
qualified immunity.
CONCLUSION
Prisoner lawsuits under § 1983 are not popular with the courts or
with legislators. This unpopularity is likely the result of the thought,
rightfully in many cases, that these suits are frivolous and occupy an
inordinate amount of judicial time, energy, and resources. We must
be mindful, however, that there are indeed meritorious claims that
arise out of the prison context and that we have an obligation to
ensure that the rights of some of our most vulnerable citizens are not
being trampled. The current formulation of qualified immunity for
state prison guards in a § 1983 suit is not the best fit. Rather, to best
vindicate the purposes of § 1983, a good faith affirmative defense, sim-
ilar to the one suggested by the Court in Richardson, should apply to
both state and private prison guards. While the constitutional need
for this shift may not be so readily apparent as to demand an immedi-
ate change, other developments in prisoner litigation, some of which
have been brought about by the PLRA, have produced an environ-
ment in which the shift is both practically feasible and necessary for
the protection of prisoners' rights and the public good.
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